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Deconstructing Arguments From The Case Against Hypothesis Testing 
Shlomo S. Sawilowsky 
Educational Evaluation and Research 
Wayne State University 
 
 
The main purpose of this article is to contest the propositions that (1) hypothesis tests should be 
abandoned in favor of confidence intervals, and (2) science has not benefited from hypothesis testing. The 
minor purpose is to propose (1) descriptive statistics, graphics, and effect sizes do not obviate the need for 
hypothesis testing, (2) significance testing (reporting p values and leaving it to the reader to determine 
significance) is subjective and outside the realm of the scientific method, and (3) Bayesian and qualitative 
methods should be used for Bayesian and qualitative research studies, respectively. 
 
Key words: Hypothesis testing, bracketed intervals, significance testing, effect size, Bayes, qualitative 
 
 
Introduction 
 
There has been an increasing amount of journal 
space given to the case against hypothesis 
testing over the past quarter of a century. The 
ensuing debate has taken many directions and 
has been graced with many forms of 
argumentation (see, e.g., Sawilowsky, 2003a; 
Knapp & Sawilowsky, 2001). Two styles of 
attack against hypothesis testing are contested 
here. 
 The first is the proposition that 
hypothesis testing should be abandoned in favor 
of confidence intervals. (I prefer the term 
“bracketed” instead of “confidence” interval for 
reasons noted in Sawilowsky, 2003a.) Ancillary 
to this attack is the proposition that hypothesis 
testing is tolerable if and only if it is (a) 
buttressed with a report of effect sizes, (b) 
accompanied by graphical displays, or (c) 
Bayesian. 
 The second style of attack is that 
hypothesis testing should be abandoned due to 
philosophical arguments. An example is 
embodied in the question if science has 
benefited by hypothesis testing.  
_______________________________________ 
 
Shlomo Sawilowsky is Professor of Education 
and Wayne State University Distinguished 
Faculty Fellow. Email: shlomo@wayne.edu. 
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The “Confidence” Interval Attack 
 Neyman (1934), who discovered the 
bracketed interval, equated the probabilities 
associated with its lower and upper bound with 
“the ordinary concept of probability” (1934, p. 
590). Initially, he seemed to equate it with the 
fiducial argument promulgated by Fisher (1930). 
The presumed lack of difference in the 
derivation of bracketed intervals and fiducial 
probabilities was the focus of the discussion 
subsequent to the reading of Neyman’s (1934) 
paper before the Royal Statistical Society. 
Bowley (1934) raised the question and presented 
his answer, “I am not at all sure that the 
‘confidence’ is not a ‘confidence trick’… Does 
it really take us any further?... I think it does 
not” (p. 609). He considered bracketed intervals 
to be nothing more than ordinary probabilities 
expressed in a new form. 
 Neyman (1934) replied that “questions 
raised in the discussion on the confidence 
intervals would require too much space. In fact, 
to clear up the matter entirely, a separate 
publication is needed…[and] this is in 
preparation” (p. 623). He alluded to the nature of 
the response that would follow: “It has been 
suggested in the discussion that I used the term 
‘confidence coefficient’ instead of the term 
‘fiducial probability’. This is certainly a 
misunderstanding” (p. 623). Did Neyman 
differentiate between his proposed bracketed 
interval and the venerable hypothesis test? 
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 No. Neyman (1935) immediately 
disabused readers of the statistical literature of 
this notion. He stated, “The problem of 
estimation in its form of confidence intervals 
stands entirely within the bound of the theory of 
probability” (p. 116), as does hypothesis testing. 
How, then, did the claim that bracketed intervals 
are superior and preferred eventually arise as a 
weapon in the arsenal of the camp attempting to 
make a case against hypothesis testing? 
 Neyman (1941) reviewed the 
development of the bracketed interval, which is 
translated from the Polish “przedzial ufności.” 
He mentioned this phrase in 1930 in lectures at 
the University of Warsaw and the Central 
College (Agriculture) in Warsaw, Poland. Prior 
to the redaction of the theory, Pytkowksi (1932) 
published a practical application. 
 Neyman (1941) recounted that he had 
noticed numerical similarities obtained with his 
method and that of the fiducial argument. As a 
result, he had initially assumed the two 
paradigms were identical. Neyman was satisfied 
with considering the bracketed interval as an 
extension of the fiducial argument because 
Fisher (1930) had priority. 
 Eventually, Neyman (1934) became 
estranged from the fiducial argument. He no 
longer considered the two theories 
interchangeable. He left the reasons unstated in 
his opening presentation before the Society. 
 Fisher (1934) attended the reading as a 
discussant. Historical accounts of the exchange 
were varied. Some expressed chagrin with 
Fisher, who offered minimal comments on the 
new methodology, and instead concentrated on 
the relative merits of random vs purposive 
sampling selection. Others, in noting Bowley’s 
(1934) comment that the paper was difficult to 
understand, assumed that Fisher might have 
neglected to read Neyman’s paper prior to the 
reading and simply didn’t follow it. Still others 
proposed that this was Fisher’s feeble attempt at 
blocking his baton from being passed to 
Neyman, just as Karl Pearson had tried in vain 
two decades prior with Fisher. 
 These reports misrepresented Fisher’s 
response. Most of his comments were directed to 
the sampling problem because that was the 
primary thesis of Neyman’s (1934) paper. 
Moreover, a careful review of the published 
discussion indicates that Fisher understood the 
paper’s implication quite well. His response was 
a terse defense of the fiducial argument as the 
explanation of ordinary probability. 
 Neyman (1941) was surprised! Fiducial 
probability and the fiducial distribution of a 
parameter were “more or less, lapsus linguae, 
difficult to avoid in the early stages of a new 
theory” (p. 129). The fiducial argument was 
vague, misconceived, and vacuous in explaining 
ordinary probability. 
 The aftermath took the form of 
considerable and animated debate in the 
literature on the fiducial argument. Many 
mathematical statisticians, regardless of 
theoretical persuasion, joined in the fray by 
publishing their support or concern. Wald 
(1939), Wald and Wolfowitz (1939), and Welch 
(1939) sided with the bracketed interval. Fisher 
(1935), Starkey (1938), Sukhatme (1938), and 
Yates (1939) defended the fiducial argument. 
Pitman (1939) opined that the two theories were 
essentially the same, as did Bartlett (1939) to a 
lesser extent. 
 Bartlett (1936, 1939) also escalated the 
debate with the contention that where results 
diverge, the fault lies within the fiducial 
argument. As can be imagined, Fisher (1937, 
1939a, 1939b) and Yates (1939) accepted the 
gauntlet. Jeffreys (1940) attempted to restore 
calm in claiming that the bracketed interval and 
the fiducial argument were both subsumed under 
inverse probability in the system of Bayes. This 
had no effect on the debate, of course, because 
few of the combatants were Bayesian. The 
controversy would only die with Fisher. 
 Neyman (1941) succinctly described the 
relationship between the two theories: “There is  
none” (p. 130) because “the theories of fiducial 
argument and of confidence intervals differ in 
their basic conceptions” (p. 149). He was: 
 
inclined to think that the literature on the 
theory of fiducial argument was born out 
of ideas similar to those underlying the 
theory of confidence intervals. These 
ideas, however, seem to have been too 
vague to crystallize into a mathematical 
theory. Instead, they resulted in 
misconceptions of ‘fiducial probability’ 
and ‘fiducial distribution of a 
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parameter’… In this light, the theory of 
fiducial inference is simply non-existent. 
(p. 149) 
 
 Return to the “confidence” interval 
attack against hypothesis testing. Fisher’s 
fiducial argument as the explanation of 
probability was challenged and defeated. 
However, the ordinary understanding of 
probability, even in its application to Fisher’s F 
test, was never challenged, much less defeated. 
Those who have raised the bracketed interval 
attack against hypothesis testing are merely 
exploiting Fisher’s discredited nomenclature and 
explanation of probability as he applied it to 
hypothesis testing. 
 Ordinary probability is synonymous in 
the theories of hypothesis testing and bracketed 
intervals. Certainly, this was Neyman’s (1934) 
view. That is why we concluded, “There is an 
illogical swagger associated with criticizing 
hypothesis testing and subsequently advocating 
CIs [confidence intervals]” (Compton & 
Sawilowsky,  2003, p. 584). 
 
Philosophical Attack 
 “Has science benefited from hypothesis 
testing?” The question is silly. No reputable 
quantitative physical, behavioral, or social 
scientist would overlook the breadth and depth 
of scholarly knowledge and its impact on society 
that has accrued from over a century of 
hypothesis testing. The definitive evidence: 
William Sealy Gosset created the t test to make 
better beer. 
 In an invited paper in this issue of 
Journal of Modern Applied Statistical Methods, 
Professor Dayton addresses alternative strategies 
to hypothesis testing. The motivating reference, 
Carver (1978), championed the case against 
hypothesis testing. Carver’s (1978) attack was 
based on a variant of the philosophical attack: 
speculation and assertion. “Even if properly used 
in the scientific method, educational research 
would still be better off without statistical 
significance testing” (p. 398). Carver (1993) 
offered an “Einstein” gambit: 
 
 An example from the history of 
science will help to illustrate this point. 
Michelson and Morley (1887) collected 
data relevant to the speed of light, testing 
the hypothesis that light travels through a 
medium called luminiferous ether. If this 
ether existed, then light should travel 
faster when moving in the same direction 
as the motion of the earth - similar to a 
boat traveling faster when going 
downstream compared with upstream. 
Michelson and Morley interpreted their 
published data, without tests of 
significance, as indicating that light 
traveled the same speed no matter what 
direction it was traveling. However, I 
subjected their published data to a simple 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) and found 
statistical significance associated with the 
direction the light was traveling (p. < .01). 
 It is interesting to speculate how the 
course of history might have been 
changed if Michelson and Morley had 
been trained to use this corrupt form of 
the scientific method, that is, testing the 
null hypothesis first. They might have 
concluded that there was evidence of 
significant differences in the speed of 
light associated with its direction and that 
therefore there was evidence for 
luminiferous ether. If this ether existed, 
then light should travel faster when 
moving in the same ether. That 
conclusion would have set back Einstein’s 
ideas many years, because his notions 
about relativity are based on light 
traveling in every direction at the same 
speed. Fortunately, Michelson and Morley 
did not corrupt the scientific method by 
testing the null hypothesis before they 
interpreted their data with respect to their 
research hypothesis.  (p. 288) 
 The best research articles are those 
that include no tests of statistical 
significance. In a single study, these tests 
can be replaced with estimates of effect 
size and of sampling error, such as 
standard errors and confidence intervals. 
Better still, by conducting multiple 
studies, replication of results can replace 
statistical significance testing. (p. 289-
290) 
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 Responses to Carver’s (1993) claims 
appear below. In order to understand these 
remarks, it is necessary to preface with a 
description of interferometer data. Carver (1993) 
claimed the results were null. Indeed, the 1887 
Michelson-Morley experiment is nearly 
unanimously touted as the most famous 
experiment that produced a null result. (See, 
e.g., Feynman, Leighton, & Sands, 1963.) 
 The interferometer was invented by 
Michelson to estimate the speed of light. It was 
refined by Michelson (1881) and by Michelson 
and Morley (1887a, 1887b) in an attempt to 
acquire evidence on the medium of propagation 
of light called ether proposed by Aristotle. The 
hypothesized value, equal to the Earth’s orbital 
velocity, was approximately 30 km/s. 
 Michelson and Morley (1887a) did not 
use hypothesis tests (which had yet to be 
invented, not withstanding allegations regarding 
the dating of the sign test). Initially, they 
presented “the results of the observations… 
graphically” (p. 333). Visual inspection led to 
the conclusion there was an observed fringe 
shift, although it was less than what would be 
expected if the ether existed as hypothesized. 
They wrote, “It seems fair to conclude from the 
figure that if there is any displacement due to the 
relative motion of the earth and the luminiferous 
ether, this cannot be much greater than 0.01 of 
the distance between the fringes” (Michelson & 
Morley, 1887a, p. 333). 
 Next, they presented descriptive 
statistics. This led to the conclusion that “the 
ether is probably less than one sixth the earth’s 
orbital velocity, and certainly less than one 
fourth” (p. 341). Values probably less than 5 
km/s and certainly less than 7.5 km/s are not 
null, although different from the expected value 
of 30 km/s. Some results on interferometer 
experiments conducted from 1887 - 1935 are 
compiled in Table 1. 
 The only null results via interferometry 
were obtained by Kennedy in 1926. His results 
were criticized by Illingsworth (1927), who 
found the equipment suffered from a “reduced 
optical system” (p. 692). Múnera (1998) noted 
that the Kennedy experiment was unclear 
regarding the local solar time of the initial 
orientation of the interferometer, which may 
have been at one of the four  times  per  day  that   
Table 1. A Sampling Of Interferometry Results. 
___________________________________________ 
    Velocity 
Experimenter Date   (k/s) 
Michelson & 
   Morley 1887  5 - ≤ 7.5 
Morley & Miller 1902-4  8.7  ±  0.6 
Morley & Miller 1905  7.5 
Miller  4/1/1925 10.1 ± .33 
Miller  8/1/1925 11.2 ± .33 
Miller  9/15/1925 9.6  ± .33 
Miller  9/23/1925 8.22 
Miller  2/8/26  9.3  ±  .33 
Picard & Stahel 1926  6.9 
Picard & Stahel 1927  1.45 ± .007 
Illingworth 1927  < 3 - 5 
Michelson, 
   Pease, 
   & Pearson 1929  20 
Joos  1930  < 1.5 
Kennedy & 
   Thornkike 1932  24 
Michelson, 
   Pease, 
   & Pearson 1935  20 
___________________________________________ 
 
the expected shift tends to zero. Subsequent 
experiments conducted by Illingsworth (1927) 
with Kennedy’s equipment, but with resilvered 
mirrors, presented nonnull results. 
 A variety of technical corrections were 
introduced to account for the non-null results. 
Experiments were carefully designed to rule out 
rival hypotheses, such as temperature, drift, sign 
of displacement, diurnal variation, and inter-
session averaging. Nevertheless, no study 
produced null results. 
 Most interferometer experiments were 
conducted by Miller (1933). He took more than 
200,000 readings from 1902 - 1927 based on 
12,500 turns of the interferometer, including a 
joint effort with Morley in the early 1900s. (In 
comparison, Michelson and Morley made 36 
turns in four days, and Piccard and Stahel made 
96 turns in Belgium and 60 turns in Brussels.) 
Yet, Miller never obtained a null result. 
 Shankland (et al., 1955) was Miller’s 
assistant, and subsequently was Professor of 
physics at Case Western Reserve University 
(where Morley was Professor of chemistry until 
1906). After the death of his boss, he criticized 
Miller’s work on the ether, notably with 
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assistance from Albert Einstein. DeMeo (2000, 
2001) strenuously defended Miller against 
Shankland’s criticisms. (The reader interested in 
the dissident literature on ether should read 
DeMeo, 2000, 2001; and Múnera, 1998). Later, 
Shankland (1973, p. 2283) cited a letter received 
from Einstein dated 31 August 1954:  
 
 I thank you very much for sending 
me your careful study about the Miller 
experiments. Those experiments, 
conducted with so much care, merit, of 
course, a very careful statistical 
investigation. This is more so as the 
existence of a not trivial positive effect 
would affect very deeply the fundament 
of theoretical physics as it is presently 
accepted. 
 You have shown convincingly that 
the observed effect... has nothing to do 
with ‘ether-wind’, but has to do with 
differences of temperature. 
 
 Einstein’s letter is instructive for many 
reasons. First, he believed the interferometer 
experiments on the ether “merit, of course, a 
very careful statistical analysis” [emphasis 
added]. Second, as late as the year of his death, 
Einstein still believed that the interferometer 
experiments were a threat to his special theory 
of relativity. Third, he had not updated his 
knowledge many years after the specter of 
temperature as a confounding variable was first 
raised. The Cleveland Plain Dealer (27 January 
1926) published an exchange between Einstein 
and Miller, with the latter concluding,  
 
 “The trouble with Prof. Einstein is 
that he knows nothing about my results,” 
Dr. Miller said. “He has been saying for 
thirty years that the interferometer 
experiments in Cleveland showed 
negative results. We never said they gave 
negative results, and they did not in fact 
give negative results. He ought to give me 
credit for knowing that temperature 
differences would affect results. He wrote 
to me in November suggesting this. I am 
not so simple as to make no allowance for 
temperature.” 
 
 In his experiments in 1923, and from 
1925 - 1926 at Mt. Wilson, Miller took many 
steps to control for the effects of temperature. 
The results were consistent with earlier 
measurements. Similarly, Miller (cited in Joos & 
Miller, 1934) noted, “when Morley and Miller 
designed their interferometer in 1904 they were 
fully cognizant of this... Elaborate tests have 
been made... especially with artificial heating, 
for the development of methods which would be 
free from this effect [of temperature]” (p. 114). 
The Cleveland Plain Dealer (27 January 1926) 
added, “Speaking before scientists at the 
University of Berlin, Einstein said the ether drift 
experiments [were null in the Michelson-Morley 
experiment but] on Mount Wilson they showed 
positive results”, although he attributed it to 
temperature and altitude. 
 
Einstein Gambit Declined 
 There were thousands of interferomic 
studies conducted by dozens of physicists since 
1887, and in all but one experiment the results 
were demonstrably non-null. The only known 
null result was subsequently determined to be 
caused by a miscalibrated instrument. When the 
instrument was resilvered, and the experiment 
replicated in the same location, the results were 
about 4 km/s. 
 Carver (1993) conducted a simple 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) and found 
statistical significance (p < .01). These results 
are tenable, assuming the null hypothesis was 
the observations did not differ from zero. 
Nevertheless, Carver’s (1993) analysis suffers 
from a bewildering array of questions, such as: 
 
• What data set was used? Was it from the 
noon readings, the afternoon readings, 
or a combination of readings? Was it 
from July 8th, 9th, 11th, or 12th of 1887; 
or perhaps some combination of days? 
Did it include all 36 turns of the 
interferometer, or some subset? 
• What was the value of F? 
• What were the degrees of freedom? 
• Were the underlying assumptions of 
independence, homoscedasticity, and 
normality considered? 
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• Were covariates such as diurnal 
variation or drift considered? 
• How was intersession averaging based 
on different calibration curves handled? 
• According to Carver’s (1993) advice 
and recommendation, why did he fail to 
present summary statistics or a graphic 
display of the results (either prior to the 
ANOVA or afterwards)?  
 
 Carver (1993) claimed that this 
significant result from the hypothesis test would 
have set Einstein back many years. This is 
unwarranted speculation. In his lecture in Berlin, 
Einstein rejected the 1887 Michelson-Morley 
results as being nonnull, despite the evidence 
contained within their descriptive statistics and 
graphs. Similarly, he would have ignored the 
outcome of a hypothesis test. 
 Einstein’s theory was not based on any 
experimental evidence. At various times 
throughout his career, Einstein reminisced that it 
was based on the principles of Maxwell and 
Lorentz, and he had not relied on the Michelson-
Morley experiment. Holton (1969, 1988) 
suggested that not only did the interferometer 
experiments have little or no impact, but there is 
evidence that Einstein was unaware of the 
Michelson-Morley experiment prior to 
developing the special theory of relativity. 
 Interferometer experimenters presented 
graphical displays, from simple scatter grams 
and histograms to more complex time series 
charts and hodograms. All pictorial 
representations substantiated nonzero results. 
Some of the latter interferometer experimenters 
reported standard errors. (Obviously, those who 
did not were remiss.) Many of the latter 
experimenters also reported bracketed intervals, 
and zero was not in them. Múnera (1998) 
summarized the bulk of interferometer studies 
with a bracketed interval, and zero was not in it. 
If statistical tests had been invented by 1887, it 
would have been easy to confirm the data were 
statistically significantly different from zero. 
Even Shankland (et al., 1955; 1973) was forced 
to admit this. 
 Carver (1993) reported an effect size 
(eta squared) of .005. He concluded “if 
Michelson and Morley had been forced … to do 
a test of statistical significance, they could have 
minimized its influence by reporting this effect 
size measure indicating that less that 1% of the 
variance in the speed of light was associated 
with its direction” (p. 289). The fallacy of his 
analysis is Michelson and Morley’s (1887a, 
1887b) experiment obtained results of 5 to 7.5 
km/s. Regardless of what percent of variance it 
represents, how can anyone call a speed that 
exceeds the Earth’s satellite orbital velocity 
“null” and “seek to minimize its influence”? 
 Of paramount importance, however, 
Carver (1993) tested the wrong hypothesis. Data 
inspection and graphs demonstrated interferomic 
data did not support the static model of 
luminiferous ether as a medium of propagation 
for light. Should a hypothesis test be desired, the 
correct test is whether the data were statistically 
significantly different – not from zero – but 
rather, from the hypothesized value of 30 k/s. 
 Carver (1993) described the process of 
conducting hypothesis tests prior to examining 
descriptive data as a corruption of the scientific 
method. This is a straw-person argument. Who 
promotes conducting hypothesis tests as a first 
step in the analysis of data?  Who objects to 
examining raw data (e.g., for data entry errors, 
outliers), computing descriptive statistics, and 
inspecting graphics prior, or as a follow-up, to 
conducting hypothesis tests? 
 Carver (1993) stated the best research 
articles are those that contain no hypothesis 
tests. This regressive approach would truly set 
quantitative physical, behavioral, and social 
science back more than a century. Reasonable 
people have different expectations of what 
constitutes a rare event vs what constitutes a 
common event expected by chance alone. This is 
true with a single study, and all the more so with 
many replications of a study. The debate is 
diminished, and possibly vanishes, with the 
simple agreement on a threshold (i.e., nominal 
alpha level) prior to conducting an experiment. 
 Carver’s (1993) reliance on reporting 
effect sizes as a panacea is naïve. Effect sizes 
are sensitive to their own underlying 
assumptions. In addition, the process of 
enclosing effect sizes in a bracketed interval 
relies on the same probabilities as does the 
obtained value of a hypothesis test. Carver 
(1993) also recommended the practice of 
reporting an effect size whether the hypothesis 
SHLOMO S. SAWILOWSKY 473
test “is significant or not” (p. 288). This leads to 
the “trouble with trivials” problem (see e.g., 
Sawilowsky,  2003b, 2003c). 
 Currently, it is a popular slogan among 
effect size enthusiasts to warn against 
“becoming stupid in another metric.” Yet, 
Carver (1993) interpreted an eta squared of .005 
as null to minimize the study outcome. The 
experimental results Carver (1993) sought to 
minimize were speeds of over 16,750 miles per 
hour! 
 
The Next Generation of Arguments 
 As soon as these two lines of attack 
against hypothesis testing falter, three more 
assaults are quickly proffered. This is not the 
place to elaborate on them, but they are parried 
briefly below. 
 The first is to replace hypothesis testing 
with significance testing. P values are reported 
and it is left to the reader to decide if it is 
significant. Aside from being outside the realm 
of the scientific method, subjective significance 
testing is, in my view, a recipe for disaster 
(Knapp & Sawilowsky, 2001). (Note that 
Carver’s, 1978, 1993, attack is actually against 
hypothesis testing, although he calls it a case 
against significance testing.) 
 The second is to abandon the frequentist 
approach and conduct a Bayesian analysis. I 
strongly promote the method of Bayes in 
selecting a pinch hitter in baseball because of the 
plethora of informative priors. However, in the 
absence of definitive objective priors, a 
condition that pervades most of physical, 
behavioral, and social science, Bayesian 
methods are not likely to be optimal. 
 The third is to abandon quantitative 
methodology altogether in favor of qualitative 
techniques. I discussed this option elsewhere 
(Sawilowsky, 1999). Qualitative methods should 
be used when the research hypothesis is 
qualitative, not because of some perceived 
limitation of a quantitative method in pursuing a 
quantitative research question. 
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